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This paper axiomatizes the robust control criterion of multiplier prefer-
ences introduced by Hansen and Sargent (2001). The axiomatization relates
multiplier preferences to other classes of preferences studied in decision theory,
in particular the variational preferences, recently introduced by Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Rustichini (2006). The paper also establishes a link between the
parameters of the multiplier criterion and the observable behavior of the agent.
This link enables measurement of the parameters on the basis of observable
choice data and provides a useful tool for applications.
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1 Introduction




where u is a utility function and q is a subjective probability distribution on the states
of the world. A decision maker with such preferences behaves as if he is certain that
the state is distributed according to the probabilistic model q.
In order to model situations where the decision maker does not have enough
information to formulate a single probabilistic model and have full condence in it,
for example when it is hard to statistically distinguish between similar probabilistic
models, Hansen and Sargent (2001) formulated the criterion
V (f) = min
p
Z
u(f)dp + R(pkq); (2)
where  2 (0;1] is a parameter and the function R(pkq) is the relative entropy of p
with respect to q. Relative entropy, otherwise known as Kullback{Leibler divergence,
is a measure of \distance" between two probability distributions. An interpretation of
equation (2) is that the decision maker has some best guess q of the true probability
distribution, but does not fully trust it. Instead, he considers many other probabili-
ties p to be plausible, with plausibility diminishing proportionally to their \distance"
from q. The role of the proportionality parameter  is to measure the degree of trust
of the decision maker in the reference probability q, or, in other words, the concern
for model misspecication. Higher values of  correspond to more trust; in the limit,
when  = 1, the decision maker fully trusts his reference probability and uses the
expected utility criterion (1).
Multiplier preferences (2) also belong to the more general class of variational
preferences studied by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006a), which have
the representation
V (f) = min
p
Z
u(f)dp + c(p); (3)
where c(p) is a \cost function". The interpretation of (3) is like that of (2), and
multiplier preferences are a special case of variational preferences with c(p)=R(pkq).
2In general, the conditions that the function c(p) in (3) has to satisfy are very weak,
which makes variational preferences a very broad class. In addition to expected utility
preferences and multiplier preferences, this class also nests the maxmin expected
utility preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), as well as the mean-variance
preferences of Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958).
An important contribution of Maccheroni et al. (2006a) was to provide an ax-
iomatic characterization of variational preferences. Because variational preferences
are a very broad class of preferences, it is desirable to establish an observable distinc-
tion between multiplier preferences and other subclasses of variational preferences.
This is, for example, the case with the maxmin expected utility preferences of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989): a strengthening of the Maccheroni et al.'s (2006a) axioms
restricts the general cost function to be in the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) class.
The main nding of this paper is that the Sure Thing Principle of Savage (imposed
on the Anscombe{Aumann domain) characterizes the class of multiplier preferences
within the class of variational preferences. This is possible because, as the main
theorem shows, the class of multiplier preferences is precisely the intersection of the





for some real valued function .1 Figure 1 depicts the relationships between these
classes.2 The Sure Thing Principle axiom used in the characterization is standard in
the literature; in particular, it is not in any way related to the very specic functional
form of relative entropy|it's the interaction between the axioms that delivers the
representation.
The proposed axiomatic characterization is important for three reasons. First, it
provides a set of testable predictions of the model that allow for its empirical veri-
cation. This will help evaluate whether multiplier preferences, which have already
1For axiomatic characterizations of such preferences see Neilson (1993, 2009), Nau (2001, 2006),
Ergin and Gul (2009), and Grant, Polak, and Strzalecki (2009).
2Hansen and Sargent also introduced a closely related class of constraint preferences, represented
by V (f) = minfpjR(pkq)g
R
S(u  f)dp, which are a special case of Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989)
maxmin expected utility preferences; see Figure 1. Due to their greater analytical tractability,
multiplier|rather than constraint|preferences are used in applications.
3Figure 1: Relations between classes of preferences: VP|variational preferences,
MP|multiplier preferences, SOEU|second order expected utility preferences, EU|
expected utility preferences, MEU|maxmin expected utility preferences, CP|
constraint preferences.
proved useful in modeling behavior at the macro level,3 are an accurate model of indi-
vidual behavior. Second, the axiomatization establishes a link between the parameters
of the multiplier criterion and the observable behavior of the agent. This link enables
measurement of the parameters on the basis of observable choice data alone, without
relying on unveriable assumptions. Finally, the axiomatization is helpful in under-
standing the relation between the multiplier preferences and the axiomatic models of
ambiguity aversion motivated by the Ellsberg (1961) paradox, where people exhibit
a preference for choices involving objective rather than subjective probabilities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some notation and ba-
sic concepts, as well as the denition of multiplier preferences. Section 3 presents
an axiomatic characterization of multiplier preferences within the class of variational
preferences. Section 4 studies another choice domain, introduced by Ergin and Gul
(2009), and presents a fully subjective axiomatization of multiplier preferences. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
3See Woodford (2006); Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009); Karantounias, Hansen, and Sar-




Decision problems considered in this paper involve a set S of states of the world, which
represents the possible contingencies that may occur. One of the states, s 2 S, will be
realized, but the decision maker has to choose the course of action before learning s.
Let  denote a sigma-algebra of events in S.4 The set of all nitely additive probability
measures on (S;) is denoted (S) and endowed with the weak topology, where a
net fpdgd2D converges to p if pd(A) ! p(A) for all A 2 ; the set of all countably
additive probability measures is denoted (S); its subset consisting of all measures
absolutely continuous with respect to q 2 (S) is denoted (q).
The set Z denotes the possible consequences and (Z) denotes simple probability
distributions on Z. An element of (Z) is called a lottery. A lottery paying o z 2 Z
with probability 1 is denoted z. For any two lotteries ;0 2 (Z) and a number
 2 (0;1) the lottery  +(1 )0 assigns probability (z)+(1 )0(z) to each
prize z 2 Z.
The possible choices of the decision maker, called acts, are mappings from S to
(Z).5 Formally, an act is a nite-valued, -measurable function f : S ! (Z); the
set of all such acts is denoted F((Z)). If f;g 2 F((Z)) and E 2 , then fEg
denotes an act with fEg(s) = f(s) if s 2 E and fEg(s) = g(s) if s = 2 E.
The choices of the decision maker are represented by a preference relation %,
where f % g means that the act f is weakly preferred to the act g. A functional
V : F((Z)) ! R represents % if for all f;g 2 F((Z))
f % g if and only if V (f)  V (g):
An important class of preferences are the Expected Utility (EU) preferences, where
the decision maker has a probability distribution q 2 (S) and a utility function
that evaluates each consequence u : Z ! R. A preference relation % has an EU
4The set S may be innite or nite. When S is nite it is assumed that  = 2S.
5This setting was introduced by Fishburn (1970); settings of this type are usually named after
Anscombe and Aumann (1963), who were the rst to work with them.









In each state of the world s the decision maker computes the expected utility of
the lottery f(s) and then averages those values across states. By slightly abusing
notation, dene the ane function u : (Z) ! R by u() =
P
z2Z u(z)(z). Using





Risk aversion is the phenomenon where sure payos are preferred to ones that are
stochastic but have the same expected monetary value. If Z = R, i.e., lotteries have
monetary payos, then risk averse EU preferences have concave utility functions u.
Likewise, one preference relation is more risk averse than another if it has a \more
concave" utility function. More formally, an EU preference represented by (u1;q1) is
more risk averse than one represented by (u2;q2) if and only if q1 = q2 and u1 = u2,
where  : R ! R is a strictly increasing concave transformation. A special role will










for  < 1;
u for  = 1:
(6)
Lower values of  correspond to \more concave" transformations, i.e., more risk aver-
sion.
2.2 Sources of Uncertainty and the Ellsberg Paradox
Observe that every act f : S ! (Z) involves two sources of uncertainty: rst, the
payo of f is contingent on the state of the world, for which there is no objective
probability given; second, given the state, f(s) is an objective lottery.
The existence of two sources of uncertainty enables a distinction between purely
objective lotteries, i.e., acts which pay the same lottery  2 (Z) irrespectively of the
state of the world and purely subjective acts, i.e., acts that in each state of the world
6pay o a degenerate lottery z for some z 2 Z, which possibly depends on s. With a
slight abuse of notation, let (Z) denote the set of purely objective lotteries. Note
that given q 2 (S) each purely subjective act f induces a purely objective lottery
f 2 (Z) dened by f(z) = q(f 1(z)) for all z 2 Z.
An EU decision maker has a the same attitude toward objective lotteries and
toward subjective acts. From the representation (5) it follows that for any two purely















In particular, any purely subjective act f is indierent to the objective lottery f
that it induces.
However, more general preferences need not have such a uniform decision attitude
and they may be source sensitive, i.e., exhibit more aversion to one source than the
other. This is illustrated by the Ellsberg's (1961) Paradox, which demonstrates that
most people prefer choices involving risk (i.e., situations in which the probability is
well specied) to choices involving ambiguity (where the probability is not specied).
Example 1 (Ellsberg Paradox). Consider two urns containing colored balls. The
decision maker can bet on the color of the ball drawn from each urn. Urn I contains
100 red and black balls in unknown proportion, while Urn II contains 50 red and 50
black balls.
In this situation, most people are indierent between betting on red from Urn I
and on black from Urn I; this reveals that, in the absence of evidence against sym-
metry, they view those two contingencies as interchangeable. Moreover, most people
are indierent between betting on red from Urn II and on black from Urn II; this
preference is justied by their knowledge of the composition of Urn II. However, most
people strictly prefer betting on red from Urn II to betting on red from Urn I, thereby
displaying ambiguity aversion.
Ambiguity aversion cannot be reconciled with the EU model. To see that, let the
7state space S = fR;Bg represent the possible draws from Urn I.
Betting $100 on red from Urn I corresponds to an act fR = (100;0) while betting
$100 on black from Urn I corresponds to an act fB = (0;100). On the other hand,
betting $100 on red from Urn II corresponds to a lottery R = 1
2100 + 1
20, while
betting $100 on black from Urn II corresponds to a lottery B = 1
20 + 1
2100. These
correspondences reect the fact that betting on Urn I involves subjective uncertainty,
while betting on Urn II involves objective risks. Note in particular, that R = B.
Suppose that the subjective probability of drawing red from Urn I is q and black
from Urn I is 1 q. Observe that V (R) = V (B) = 1
2u(100)+ 1
2u(0), whereas V (fR) =
qu(100)+(1 q)u(0) and V (fB) = (1 q)u(100)+qu(0). Because of the indierence
V (fR) = V (fB) it follows that q = 1
2; hence, V (fR) = V (fB) = 1
2u(100) + 1
2u(0). It
follows that B  R  fR  fB, contradicting the typical Ellsberg choices. N
As the above example shows, the Ellsberg pattern of choices cannot be explained
by a model with a unique probability measure and with uniform aversion to both
sources. In the literature there have been two main approaches to this problem.
The rst one replaces the probability measure q with some other measure of belief
that captures the decision maker's lack of information about the source, see, e.g.,
the Choquet model of Schmeidler (1989), Maxmin model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), or variational preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006a). The other approach is
to keep q but to introduce another parameter that captures the higher aversion toward
variability coming from one source than another, as in the SOEU model (Neilson,
1993, 2009; Nau, 2001, 2006; Ergin and Gul, 2009; Grant et al., 2009). As this paper
shows (see Section 3.3), the multiplier preferences have both representations and for
this reason they belong to both families of models.
2.3 Multiplier Preferences
Hansen and Sargent (2001) and Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams
(2006) introduced the class of multiplier preferences where the decision maker does
not know the true probabilistic model p, but has a \best guess", or approximating
model q, also called the reference probability. The decision maker thinks that the true
probability p is somewhere near the reference probability q. The notion of distance
used by Hansen and Sargent is relative entropy.
8Denition 1. Let a reference measure q 2 (S) be xed. The relative entropy








dq)dp if p 2 (q),
1 otherwise.
A decision maker who is concerned with model misspecication computes his
expected utility according to all probabilities p, but he does not treat them equally.
Probabilities closer to his \best guess" have more weight in his decision.
Denition 2. A relation % has a multiplier representation if it is represented by





where u : (Z) ! R is a non-constant ane function,  2 (0;1], and q 2 (S). In
this case, % is called a multiplier preference.
The multiplier representation of % may suggest the following interpretation. First,
the decision maker chooses an act without knowing the true distribution p. Second,
\Nature" chooses the probability p in order to minimize the decision maker's expected
utility. Nature is not free to choose, but it incurs a \cost" for using each p. Prob-
abilities p that are farther from the reference measure q have a larger potential for
lowering the decision maker's expected utility, but Nature has to incur a larger cost
in order to select them.
This interpretation suggests that a decision maker with such preferences is con-
cerned with model misspecication and makes decisions that are robust to such mis-
specication. He is pessimistic about the outcome of his decision which leads him
to exercise caution in choosing the course of action. Such cautious behavior is rem-
iniscent of the Ellsberg paradox, as in Example 1 above. In fact, as Example 2 in
Section 3.4.2 shows, multiplier preferences can be used to model such behavior.
93 Axiomatization with Objective Risk
3.1 Variational Preferences
To capture ambiguity aversion, Maccheroni et al. (2006a), henceforth MMR, introduce
the class of variational preferences, with representation




u(f(s))dp + c(p); (7)
where c : S ! [0;1] is a cost function.
Multiplier preferences are a special case of variational preferences where c(p) =
R(p k q). The variational criterion (7) can be given the same interpretation as
the multiplier criterion (2): Nature wants to reduce the decision maker's expected
utility by choosing a probability distribution p, but she is not entirely free to choose.
Using dierent p's leads to dierent values of the decision maker's expected utility
R
S u(f(s))dp, but comes at a cost c(p).
In order to characterize variational preferences behaviorally, MMR use the follow-
ing axioms.
Axiom A1 (Weak Order). The relation % is transitive and complete.
Axiom A2 (Weak Certainty Independence). For all f;g 2 F((Z)), ;0 2 (Z),
and  2 (0;1),
f + (1   ) % g + (1   ) ) f + (1   )
0 % g + (1   )
0:
Axiom A3 (Continuity). For any f;g;h 2 F((Z)) the sets f 2 [0;1] j f + (1  
)g % hg and f 2 [0;1] j h % f + (1   )gg are closed.
Axiom A4 (Monotonicity). If f;g 2 F((Z)) and f(s) % g(s) for all s 2 S, then
f % g.
Axiom A5 (Uncertainty Aversion). If f;g 2 F((Z)) and  2 (0;1), then
f  g ) f + (1   )g % f:
Axiom A6 (Nondegeneracy). f  g for some f;g 2 F((Z)).
Axiom A8 (Weak Monotone Continuity). If f;g 2 F((Z)),  2 (Z), fEngn1 2
10 with E1  E2   and
T
n1 En = ;, then f  g implies that there exists n0  1
such that En0f  g.
MMR show that the preference % satises Axioms A1{A6 if and only if % is
represented by (7) with an ane and non-constant u : (Z) ! R and c : S ! [0;1]
that is convex, lower semicontinuous, and grounded (achieves value zero). Moreover,
Axiom A8 guarantees that function c is concentrated only on countably additive
measures (observe, that Axiom A8 holds trivially if S is nite).
The conditions that the cost function c satises are very general. For example, if
c(p) = 1 for all measures p 6= q, then (7) reduces to (5), i.e., preferences are expected
utility. Similarly, setting c(p) = 0 for all measures p in a closed and convex set C and
c(p) = 1 otherwise, denoted c = C, reduces (7) to the representation of the Maxmin
Expected Utility preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
As mentioned before, multiplier preferences also are a special case of variational
preferences. They can be obtained by setting c(p) = R(p k q). The next section
shows that pinning down this functional form is possible with Savage's P2 applied to
all Anscombe{Aumann acts.6
3.2 Axiomatization of Multiplier Preferences
Axiom P2 (Savage's Sure-Thing Principle). For all E 2  and f;g;h;h0 2 F((Z))
fEh % gEh ) fEh
0 % gEh
0:
Denition 3. An event E 2  is non-null if there exist f;g;h 2 F((Z)) such that
fEh  gEh.
Theorem 1. If S has at least three disjoint non-null events, then Axioms A1{A6,
A8, and P2, are necessary and sucient for % to have a multiplier representation
(2). Moreover, in this case two triples (0;u0;q0) and (00;u00;q00) represent the same
multiplier preference % if and only if q0 and q00 are identical and there exist  > 0
and  2 R such that u0 = u00 +  and 0 = 00.
The two cases:  = 1 (lack of concern for model misspecication) and  < 1
6If the existence of certainty equivalents of lotteries is assumed, i.e., for any  2 (Z) there
exists z 2 Z with z  , then P2 can be weakened and imposed only on purely subjective acts.
11(concern for model misspecication) can be distinguished on the basis of the Indepen-
dence Axiom.7 In the case when  is nite, its numerical value is uniquely determined,
given u. A positive ane transformation of u changes the scale on which  operates,
so  has to change accordingly. This is reminiscent of the necessary adjustments of
the CARA coecient when units of account are changed.
In addition, it should be mentioned that there exists an axiomatization by Wang
(2003) of a class of preferences that includes multiplier preferences as a special case.
However, his result is formally unrelated and it assumes dierent primitives: pref-
erences are dened on triples (f;C;q), where f is an act with monetary payos,
C  (S) is a set of probability measures and q 2 (S) is a reference measure.
In particular, his axioms impose consistency conditions as the elements C and q are
varied exogenously. In contrast, here C = (S) and q is xed and derived from
preferences.
3.3 Sketch of the Proof
The following variational formula (see, e.g., Proposition 1.4.2 of Dupuis and Ellis,
1997) plays a critical role in the analysis of multiplier preferences. For any bounded










   dq
!
: (8)





u(f(s))dp + R(pkq) (9a)









representations are ordinally equivalent, establishing the necessity of the MMR and
Savage axioms.
7The weaker Certainty Independence Axiom is also sucient for making such a distinction.
Alternatively, Machina and Schmeidler's (1995) axiom of Horse/Roulette Replacement or Grant
and Polak's (2006) axiom of Betting Neutrality could be used.
12The suciency argument relies on the fact that the MMR axioms guarantee the
existence an ane utility function u : (Z) ! R and a functional I that maps utility-
valued acts to reals, such that the functional f 7! I(u(f)) represents the preferences.
For simplicity, assume that u(Z) = R. MMR show that the functional I has the
translation invariance property that I(uf +k) = I(uf)+k for any act f and any
k 2 R. On the other hand, axiom P2 together with the MMR axioms implies that








for some strictly increasing function .8 Moreover, Axioms A3 and A5 imply that 
is continuous and concave and Axiom A8 implies that q is countably additive. This





























which by uniqueness of the SOEU representation implies that there exist (k) >
0;(k) 2 R such that (x + k) = (k)(x) + (k) for all x;k 2 R. This is a
generalized Pexider equation, whose only solutions are  =  for  2 (0;1], which
establishes the suciency of the axioms.
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Second-Order Expected Utility
It follows from the above proof that the class of multiplier preferences is precisely the
intersection of the class of variational preferences and the class of SOEU preferences.9
8Recall that Savage's P2 axiom is imposed on F((Z)), not just the purely subjective acts, as
in Savage (1972). The fact that imposing all Savage's axioms on F((Z)) implies SOEU has been
rst shown by Neilson (1993); I am grateful to Peter Klibano for this reference.
9The fact that multiplier preferences rank purely subjective acts according to the EU criterion
has been observed before in various levels of generality by Jacobson (1973), Whittle (1981), Skiadas
(2003), and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006b). Because of this fact, it is not possible
13When viewed as a SOEU preference, multiplier preferences impose the condition
 = . When viewed as a variational preference, multiplier preferences impose
the condition c(p) = R(pk q). It is worthwhile to notice that this means that no
other variational preferences have a SOEU representation, i.e., assuming that c is
a statistical distance other than the relative entropy leads to models which do not
have a SOEU representation for any . Conversely, no other SOEU preference has a
variational representation, i.e., assuming that  is a function other than the negative
exponential leads to models which do not have a variational representation for any c.
3.4.2 Source sensitivity of multiplier preferences
Focus on the case  < 1 and notice that from the SOEU representation (9b) it















This means that the decision maker has a dierent attitude toward objective lotteries
and toward subjective acts, while behaving according to EU in each subdomain. In
particular, he is more averse toward subjective uncertainty (as captured by   u)
than toward objective risk (as captured by u). This phenomenon is called Second
Order Risk Aversion.10 What leads to the Ellsberg-type behavior are violations of
EU across those domains. The following example shows that, because of this property,
multiplier preferences can be useful for modelling Ellsberg-type behavior.
Example 2 (Ellsberg's Paradox revisited). In the context of Example 1 consider a




to distinguish multiplier preferences from the EU preferences based on the preferences over purely
subjective acts alone and a setting with multiple sources of uncertainty, like the Anscombe{Aumann
or Ergin{Gul ones, is needed.
10This notion was introduced by Ergin and Gul (2009) in a setting with two subjective sources of





















. Because of the indierence V (fR) = V (fB) it follows that q = 1
2; hence,










. By Jensen's inequality, B  R 
fR  fB for all  < 1. This means that the decision maker prefers objective risk
to probabilistically equivalent subjective uncertainty, displaying behavior typical in
Ellsberg's experiments. N
3.4.3 Measurement of Parameters
Ellsberg's paradox provides a natural setting for the experimental measurement of
the parameters of the model because the intensity of the preference for betting on
the rst urn rather than the second one, i.e., the premium that the decision maker is
willing to pay to switch between these two bets is directly related to the value of the
parameter .
Example 3. In the context of Examples 1 and 2 consider a multiplier preference with
a CRRA utility function u(z) = (w+z)1 , where w is the initial level of wealth, and














. Let x denote the certainty
equivalent of R and B, i.e., the amount of money that, when received for sure,











The observed value of the certainty equivalent x allows to compute the curvature
parameter  using Equation (11); let (x) be the solution to this equation.11
Similarly, let y be the certainty equivalent of fR and fB, i.e., the amount of money




















The observed value of the certainty equivalent y allows to compute the parameter ;
using equation (12); let (x;y) be the solution to this equation. N
11If the utility function u belongs to some higher-dimensional family of utility functions, more
certainty equivalents need to be elicited in order to infer all of its parameters.
15The procedure described above suggests that simple choice experiments could be
used for empirical measurement of both u and . Such measurement of parameters
would very useful in applied settings, where it is important to know the numerical
values of parameters. For example, the macro-nance literature devotes a lot of
attention to the discrepancy between the micro- and macro-level estimates of the
curvature of u. By analogy, it would be valuable to know the micro-level estimate
of  to be able to compare it to the value calibrated from the macro-level data. The
above procedure provides a simple \revealed-preference" method of comparison, that
is complementary to the heuristic method of \detection error probabilities" developed
by Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2000) and Hansen and Sargent (2007).
4 Axiomatization with two subjective sources
This section discusses a choice domain, which does not rely on the assumption of
objective risk: instead, there are two sources of subjective uncertainty, towards which
the decision maker may have dierent attitudes. This type of environment was dis-
cussed by Chew and Sagi (2008), Ergin and Gul (2009), and Nau (2001, 2006); for
an empirical application see Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker (2009).
4.1 Subjective Sources of Uncertainty
Assume that the state space has a product structure S = Sa  Sb, where a and b
are two separate issues, or sources of uncertainty, towards which the decision maker
may have dierent attitudes. In comparison with the Anscombe{Aumann framework,
where objective risk is one of the sources, here both sources are subjective. Let Aa be
a sigma algebra of subsets of Sa and Ab be a sigma algebra of subsets of Sb. Let a be
the sigma algebra of sets of the form A  Sb for all A 2 Aa, b be the sigma algebra
of sets of the form Sa  B for all B 2 Ab, and  be the sigma algebra generated by
a [ b. Let F(Z) be the set of all simple acts f : S ! Z; moreover, let Fa be the
set of acts that are a-measurable, and likewise for Fb. Let U denote the set u(Z).
Ergin and Gul (2009) axiomatized preferences which are general enough to ac-
commodate probabilistic sophistication and even second-order probabilistic sophisti-











where the measures qa 2 (Sa) and qb 2 (Sb) are convex-ranged,12 u : Z ! R,
and  : D ! R is a strictly increasing and continuous function with domain D :=
f
R
Sa u(f(sa;sb))dqa(sa) j f 2 Fag. To characterize preferences represented by (13),
Ergin and Gul (2009) use the following axioms.
Axiom P1'. (Weak Order) The preference % is complete and transitive
Axiom P2'. (Sure Thing Principle) For all events Ea 2 a and Eb 2 b and acts
f;g;h;h0 2 Fa and ~ f; ~ g;~ h;~ h0 2 F
(a) fEah0 % gEah i fEah0 % gEah0
(b) ~ fEb~ h0 % ~ gEb~ h i ~ fEb~ h0 % ~ gEb~ h0
Axiom P3'. (Eventwise Monotonicity) For all z;z0 2 Z, f 2 F, and all nonnull
events E 2 : zEf % z0
Ef i z % z0.
Axiom P4'. (Strong Comparative Probability)






(b) For all f;g;f0;g0 2 Fa such that f  g and f0  g0, and for all ~ h;~ h0 2 F and





Axiom P5'. (Nondegeneracy) There exist x;y 2 Z such that x  y.
Axiom P6'. (Small Event Continuity) For all f;g 2 F with f  g, and all z 2 Z
(a) there exists a partition E1;:::;En 2 a of S such that for all i zEif  g and
f  zEig,
(b) there exists a partition F1;:::;Fm 2 b of S such that for all j zFjf  g and
f  zFjg .
12A measure q is convex ranged if for every E 2  and every  2 (0;1) there exists  3 E0  E
with q(E0) = q(E). It is well known that this requirement is equivalent to nonatomicity for
q 2 (S). Any measure on R that has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure has this
property; in applications of multiplier preferences, q is most often a Normal distribution.
17There is a close relationship between representations (13) and (10). The role of
objective risk is now taken by a subjective source: issue a. For each sb, the decision
maker computes the expected utility of f(;sb) and then averages those values using
function .
4.2 Second-Order Risk Aversion
In the Anscombe{Aumann framework, concavity of the function  is responsible for
second-order risk aversion, i.e., higher aversion towards subjective uncertainty than
towards objective risk. This property is a consequence of the axiom of Uncertainty
Aversion (Axiom A5). Similarly, in the present setup, the concavity of function 
is responsible for higher aversion towards issue b than towards issue a. This prop-
erty was introduced by Ergin and Gul (2009) who formally dened it in terms of
mean-preserving spreads. However, this denition refers to the probability measures
obtained from the representation and hence is not expressed directly in terms of
observables.13
In the presence of other axioms, the following purely behavioral axiom is equivalent
to Ergin and Gul's (2009) denition.
Axiom A5' (Second Order Risk Aversion). For any f;g 2 Fb and any E 2 a if
f  g, then fEg % f.
This axiom is a direct subjective analogue of Schmeidler's (1989) axiom of Uncer-
tainty Aversion (Axiom A5).
Theorem 2. Suppose % satises axioms P1'{P6' and certainty equivalents exist, i.e.,
for any f 2 F(Z) there exists z 2 Z with z  f. Then Axiom A5' is satised if and
only if the function  in (13) is concave.14
13Theorems 2 and 5 of Ergin and Gul (2009) characterize second-order risk aversion in terms of
induced preferences over induced Anscombe{Aumann acts and an analogue of Axiom A5 in that
induced setting. However, just as with mean-preserving spreads, those induced Anscombe{Aumann
acts are constructed using the subjective probability measure derived from the representation.
14The full analysis that does not rely on the existence of certainty equivalents is contained in
Appendix B.
184.3 Axiomatization of Multiplier Preferences
The additional axiom that delivers multiplier preferences in this framework is Con-
stant Absolute Second Order Risk Aversion.
Axiom A2' (Constant Absolute Second Order Risk Aversion). For any event E 2 a
for all f;g 2 F(Z), h;h0 2 Fa
fEh % gEh ) fEh
0 % gEh
0:
In addition, a technical axiom, similar to Axiom A8, is needed.
Axiom A8' (Fb-Monotone Continuity). If f;g 2 F(Z), x 2 Z, fEngn1 2 b with
E1  E2   and
T
n1 En = ;, then f  g implies that there exists n0  1 such
that xEn0f  g.
Theorem 3. Axioms P1'{P6', A2', A5', and A8' are necessary and sucient for %
to be represented by V , where









and u : Z ! R,  2 (0;1], and qa 2 (Sa);qb 2 (Sb) are convex-ranged measures.
4.4 Sketch of the Proof
By Theorem 3 of Ergin and Gul (2009) Axioms P1'{P6' are equivalent to % being
represented by (13). Assume for simplicity that certainty equivalents exist and that
u(Z) = R. By Theorem 2 Axiom A5' is equivalent to  : R ! R being concave.
Moreover, it is easy to see that Axiom A8' is equivalent to qb being countably additive.
A direct verication establishes that Axiom A2' is necessary.
To establish the suciency of Axiom A2', observe that by convex-rangedness of qa
there exists an event E 2 a such that qa(E) = 1
2. For all k 2 R and f0;g0 2 Fb
Axiom A2' (applied to f;g;h, and h0 such that u(f) = 2u(f0) and u(g) = 2u(g0) and





























which, by the same argument as in the proof of implies that  = .
5 Conclusion
One of the challenges in decision theory lies in nding decision models that would do
better than Expected Utility in describing individual choices, but would at the same
time be easy to incorporate into economic models of aggregate behavior.
This paper studies the model of multiplier preferences which is known to satisfy
the latter requirement. By obtaining an axiomatic characterization of this model, the
paper studies its individual choice properties, which helps to determine whether it
also satises the rst requirement mentioned above.
The axiomatization provides a set of testable implications of the model, which will
be helpful in its empirical verication. The axiomatization also enables measurement
of the parameters of the model on the basis of observable choice data alone, thereby
providing a useful tool for applications of the model.
Appendix: Proofs
Let B0() denote the set of all real-valued -measurable simple functions and let
B0(;K) be the set of all functions in B0() that take values in a convex set K  R.
In the course of the proof of Theorem 1 a result of Grant et al. (2009) will be
invoked that delivers a SOEU representation on each nite partition of S. The fol-
lowing theorem shows that these representations can be \patched" together to obtain
an overall SOEU representation on S.
Let  denote the set of all nite partitions of S that are composed of events in ;
let 3   denote the set of all such partitions that contain at least three non-null
events. For any G 2  let A(G) be the algebra generated by G. For any G 2 3
let FG((Z)) denote the set of acts in F((Z)) that are measurable with respect
to A(G).
20Denition 4 (3-SOEU). A preference % on F((Z)) is 3-SOEU i for any G 2 3
the restriction of % to FG((Z)) has representation f 7!
P
E2G G(uG(f(E)))pG(E)
with a nonconstant ane function uG : (Z) ! R with range UG, a strictly increasing,
continuous, and concave function G : UG ! R and measure pG : A(G) ! [0;1] such
that at least three events in G have nonzero probability.
Theorem 4. Suppose that 3 6= ; and that % satises Axioms A1, A4, and P2.
The preference % is 3-SOEU if and only if there exists a measure p 2 (S) and a
nonconstant ane function u : (Z) ! R with range U, and a strictly increasing,
concave and continuous function  : U ! R such that % is represented by f 7!
R
S (u(f(s)))dp(s).
Proof. The suciency of the representation is straightforward. For necessity, let
G;G0 2 3. The restrictions of % to FG((Z)) and to FG0((Z)) coincide on constant
acts (Z). Thus, from the uniqueness of the von-Neumann-Morgentstern utility, it
follows that uG and uG0 are identical up to a positive ane transformation. Fix any
two prizes z  z0 and for each G 2 3 normalize uG so that uG(z) = 1 and uG(z0) = 0.
Dene u to be the common utility function for all G 2 3.
Let  G 2 3 be some xed element of 3. For any G;G0 2  dene G  G0 i G is
ner than G0, i.e,. for every E 2 G there exists F 2 G0 with E  F. For any G;G0 2 
let G _G0 be their coarsest common renement and let G ^G0 be their nest common
coarsening.
Lemma 1. If E 2  is non-null, then for any nite -measurable partition fF1;:::Fng
of E at least one of the sets F1;:::Fn is non-null.
Proof. Claim 1: For any non-null E 2  there exist ;; 2 (Z) such that
E  E. Proof: there exist f;g;h 2 F((Z)) such that fEh  gEh and by P2
choose h to equal to some  2 (Z) dierent than any of the prizes given by f and g.
Let fE1;:::;En;Ecg be a partition of S with respect to which both fE and gE are
measurable. Let  be the most preferred element among ff(Ei) j i = 1;:::;ng and
let  be the least preferred element among fg(Ei) j i = 1;:::;ng. By A4, E % fE
and gE % E. Thus E  E.
Claim 2: For any non-null E 2  and any two-element -measurable partition
fF1;F2g of E at least one of the sets F1;F2 is non-null. Proof: Suppose that there
21exists a two-element -measurable partition fF1;F2g of E such that both sets F1;F2
are null. Then Fih  Fih for any h 2 F((Z)) and all i = 1;2. In particular,
E = F1(F2)  F1(F2) = F2(F1)  F2(F1) = E. Contradiction with
Claim 1.
Claim 3: (Inductive step). If for any non-null E0 2  and any n-element -
measurable partition fF1;:::Fng of E0 at least one of the sets F1;:::Fn is non-
null, then for any non-null E 2  and any n + 1-element -measurable partition
fF1;:::Fn+1g of E at least one of the sets F1;:::Fn+1 is non-null. Proof: By Claim 2,
at least one of the sets F1[[Fn =: E0 and Fn+1 are non-null. If the latter is true,
this concludes the proof. If E0 is non-null, then the premise of this claim applied to
the set E0 and its partition fF1;:::Fng concludes the proof.
Lemma 2. G _ G0 2 3 for any G 2 3 and G0 2 .
Proof. By assumption, there are at least three disjoint non-null sets in G. By Lemma 1
for any such set E 2 G there is at least one non-null member of fE \ F j F 2 G0g.
Thus, there are at least three non-null members of G _ G0.
Lemma 3. The functions fGgG23 and measures fpGgG23 can be chosen in such
a way that there exists  : U ! R such that G =  for any G 2 3 and for any
G;G0 2 3 the restrictions of measures pG and pG0 to A(G ^ G0) coincide.
Proof. For each G 2 3 normalize G so that G(u(z)) = 1 and G(u(z0)) = 0. First,
let G;H 2 3 such that G  H. Observe, that FH((Z))  FG((Z)), so both
(H;pH) and (H;pH) represent preferences on FH((Z)). By the uniqueness of the
expected utility representation, the restriction of pH to G coincides with pG and the
functions H and G are identical up to a positive ane transformation, which by the
above normalization assumption implies that they are equal.
Second, let G;G0 2 3. By Lemma 2, G _ G0 2 3. Furthermore, G _ G0  G and
G _ G0  G0. From the above paragraph it follows that G = G_G0 = G0. Let  be
this common function. Also the restriction of pG_G0 to A(G) coincides with pG; hence
the restriction of pG_G0 to A(G ^G0) coincides with the restriction of pG to A(G ^G0).
Likewise, the restriction of pG_G0 to A(G0) coincides with pG0; hence the restriction of
pG_G0 to A(G ^ G0) coincides with the restriction of pG0 to A(G ^ G0).
22Lemma 4. There exists p 2 (S) such that p(E) = pG(E) for any E 2  and any
G 2 3 with E 2 G.
Proof. For any E 2  dene the partition GE :=  G _fE;Ecg; by Lemma 2, GE 2 3.
Dene the function p :  ! [0;1] by p(E) := pGE(E). Let E;F 2  such that
E\F = ;. Let GEF :=  G_fE;F;(E[F)cg. By Lemma 2, GEF 2 3 and by Lemma 3,
pGE(E) = pGEF(E) because E 2 A(GE ^ GEF). Likewise, pGF(F) = pGEF(F) because
F 2 A(GF ^GEF). Also, pGE[F(E[F) = pGEF(E[F) because E[F 2 A(GE[F ^GEF).
By denition, p(E [ F) = pGE[F(E [ F) = pGEF(E [ F) = pGEF(E) + pGEF(F) =
pGE(E) + pGF(F) = p(E) + p(F). Hence, p 2 (S).
Suppose G 2 3 and E 2 G. Then E 2 A(G ^ GEF) and by Lemma 3 pG(E) =
pGE(E). Hence, by denition, p(E) = pG(E).
Conclusion of the proof of Theorem 4
For any act f 2 F((Z)) dene V (f) :=
R
(u(f(s))dp(s). To verify that V
represents % let f;g 2 F((Z)). Let Gfg 2  be a partition such that both f and g
are measurable with respect to A(Gfg). Let G := Gfg _  G. By Lemma 2, G 2 3. By





uG = u, G =  (by Lemma 3), and p(E) = pG(E) for all E 2 G (by Lemma 4) it





A Proof of Theorem 1
The necessity of the axioms was shown in the sketch of proof (Section 3.3); this section
focus on suciency. Uniqueness follows from Corollary 5 of Maccheroni et al. (2006a)
A.1 Niveloidal Representation
By Lemmas 25 and 28 of Maccheroni et al. (2006a) and Lemma 22 in Maccheroni,
Marinacci, and Rustichini (2004), Axioms A1-A6 imply that there exists a non-
constant ane function u : (Z) ! R and a normalized concave functional I :
B0(;U) ! R, such that for all f % g i I(u  f)  I(u  g) where U := u((Z)).
Moreover, within this class, u is unique up to positive ane transformations.
23For any y 2 intU dene Uy := fx 2 U j x + y 2 Ug. The functional I has
the property that I( + y) = I() + y for all y 2 U and  2 B0(;Uy). Wlog,
U 2 fR;R+;R ;[0;1]g; the inclusion of the endpoints does not matter for further
analysis.
A.2 Utility Acts
For each act f, dene the utility act associated with f as u  f 2 B0(;U). The
preference on acts induces a preference on utility acts: for any 0;00 2 B0(;U)
dene 0 %u 00 i f0 % f00, for some 0 = u  f0 and 00 = u  f00. The choice of
particular versions of f0 and f00 is irrelevant, because 0 %u 00 i I(0)  I(00).
From Section A.1 it follows that 0 %u 00 i I(0)  I(00) i I(0 +y)  I(00 +y)
i 0 + y %u 00 + y for all y 2 intU and all 0;00 2 B0(;Uy).
A.3 Second-Order Expected Utility
By Proposition 7 of Maccheroni et al. (2006a) the preference % is ambiguity averse
in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). Observe that for any G 2 3 there
is a natural bijection between FG((Z)) and ((Z))jGj that preserves the axioms
A1-A6, P2, and the ambiguity aversion in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002). Thus, by Theorem 2 of Grant et al. (2009), for any G 2 3 the restriction of
% to FG((Z)) has an additive representation f 7!
P
E2G G(uG(f(E)))pG(E) with
a nonconstant ane function uG : (Z) ! R with range UG, a strictly increasing,
continuous, and concave function G : UG ! R and measure pG : A(G) ! [0;1] such
that at least three events in G have nonzero probability. By Theorem 4 above, the










where the measure q 2 (S) and the function  : U ! R is strictly increasing,
concave and continuous.
By Theorem 1 in Section 1 of Villegas (1964), Axiom A8 implies that q 2 (S).
24A.4 Proof that  = 
For any y 2 intU dene y(x) := (x+y) for all x 2 Uy. It follows from A.2 and A.3
that
R
S y 0 dq 
R
S y 00 dq i
R
S 0 dq 
R
S 00 dq for all 0;00 2 B0(;Uy).
Thus, (;q) and (y;q) are EU representations of the same preference on B0(;Uy).
By the uniqueness (up to positive ane transformation) of the EU representation it
follows that (x + y) = (y)(x) + (y) for all y 2 intU and all x 2 Uy. This is a
generalization of Pexider's equation (see equation (3) of Section 3.1.3, p. 148 of Acz el,
1966). If U is unbounded, then by Corollary 1 in Section 3.1.3 of Acz el (1966), up
to positive ane transformations, the only strictly increasing concave solutions are
of the form , for  2 (0;1]. If U is bounded, then wlog assume that intU = (0;1)
and dene the set R := f(x;y) 2 R2 j x > 0;y > 0;x + y < 1g and functions
m;l;n;k : (0;1) ! R by m := , l := , n := j(0;1), and k := j(0;1). The following
functional equation holds: k(x+y) = m(y)n(x)+l(y) for all (x;y) 2 R. It follows from
the Corollary in Acz el (2005) that either k(x) = Cx + B + P! or k(x) = !eCx + B
for some arbitrary parameters B;P;C;!; with C! 6= 0. It follows that  is an
exponential function up to positive ane transformations; by concavity,  =  in
the interior of U. By continuity of , this extends to the whole set U.
A.5 Conclusion of the Proof
Combining the results of Sections A.3 and A.4, f % g i
R
S(  u  f)dq 
R
S( ug)dq. Because q 2 , by the variational formula, it follows that f % g i
minp2S
R
S(u  f)dp + R(pkq)  minp2S
R
S(u  g)dp + R(pkq).
B Proof of Theorem 2
In order to relax the assumption of existence of certainty equivalents, the following
denition will be used.
Denition 5. Act f 2 Fa(Z) is symmetric with respect to E 2 a if for all z 2 Z
fEz  zEf:
25Symmetric acts have the same expected utility on each \half" of the state space.15
Axiom A5" (Second Order Risk Aversion). If acts f;g 2 Fa are symmetric with
respect to E 2 a, then for all F 2 b
fFg  gFf ) (fFg)E(gFf) % fFg:
The proof of Theorem 2 follows from the proof of the following stronger theorem
Theorem 5. Suppose % satises axioms P1'{P6'. Then Axiom A5" is satised if
and only if the function  in (13) is concave.
Proof. By Theorem 3 of Ergin and Gul (2009) Axioms P1'{P6' are equivalent to %
being represented by (13).
B.1 Necessity
Suppose f 2 Fa(Z) is symmetric with respect to E 2 a. Let  = qa(E). Axiom
P5' and representation (13) imply that there exist z0;z00 2 Z with z0  z00. Thus,
fEz0  z0









(u  f)dqa; (14)
Z
E





(u  f)dqa: (15)














15Symmetric acts are acts that can be \subjectively mixed", i.e, mixed using states rather than
probabilities. Such subjective mixtures are dierent from subjective mixtures studied by Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2003), whose construction relies on range-convexity of u. In
the present setting, subjective mixtures are not needed under range-convexity of u.
26Let f;g 2 Fa(Z). Denote U(f) =
R
Sa(uf)dqa and U(g) =
R
Sa(ug)dqa. Because
f and g are symmetric with respect to E 2 a,
Z
E
(u  f)dqa =
Z
Ec






(u  g)dqa =
Z
Ec
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where the inequality follows from concavity of .
B.2 Suciency
B.2.1 Convexity of D
Suppose k;l 2 D and  2 (0;1). Wlog k < l. Let f;g 2 Fa be such that k = V (f)
and l = V (g). Dene A = mins2S u(f(s)) and B = maxs2S u(g(s)) and let x;y 2 Z be
such that u(x) = A and u(y) = B. By convex-rangedness of qa, there exists E 2 a
with qa(E) =
 
B   [k + (1   )l]

(B   A) 1. Verify, that U(xEy) = k + (1   )l.
Hence, D is a convex set.
27B.2.2 Convexity of 
Suppose k;l 2 D and let f;g 2 Fa be such that k = U(f) and l = U(g). Dene
k = mins2S u(f(s)),  k = maxs2S u(f(s)), l = mins2S u(g(s)), and  l = maxs2S u(g(s)).







































4. Verify that f0 and




2 and satisfy U(f0) = k and
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(l) = V (g0







































































for all k;l 2 D. By Theorem 3 of Ergin and Gul (2009) the function  is continuous
on D; hence, by Theorem 86 of Hardy, Littlewood, and P olya (1952)  is concave.
C Proof of Theorem 3
By Theorem 3 of Ergin and Gul (2009) Axioms P1'{P6' are equivalent to % being
represented by (13). Let E 2 a be such that qa(E) = 1
2. For any v 2 D dene a
preference %v on F as follows. Let h 2 Fa be such that
R
Ec u(h(sa;sb))dqa(sa) = 1
2v
and for any f;g 2 F(Z) dene f %v g i fEh % gEh. (Because of Axiom A2',
the choice of particular h does not matter.) Dene v(u) := (1
2u + 1
2v). From












28By Axiom A2', %v=%0 for all v 2 D. Hence, v and 0 are equal up to positive
ane transformations, i.e., (1
2u + 1
2v) = (v)(1
2u) + (v) for all u;v 2 D. If D
is unbounded, then by Corollary 1 in Section 3.1.3 of Acz el (1966) the function 
belongs to the exponential class.
If D is bounded, then wlog assume that intD = (0;1). Dene the set R :=
(0;1)2 and the functions k : (0;2) ! R by k(u) = (1
2u) and l;m;n : (0;1) ! R
by l := , m := , and n(u) = (1
2u). The following functional equation holds:
k(u + v) = m(v)n(u) + l(v) for all (u;v) 2 R. It follows from the Corollary in Acz el
(2005) that either k(w) = Cw + B + P! or k(w) = !eCw + B for some arbitrary
parameters a;B;P;C;!; with C! 6= 0. Because n and k coincide on (0;1), it
follows that  is an exponential function up to positive ane transformations in the
interior of U. By continuity of , this extends to the whole set U.
In both cases  belongs to the exponential class, i.e., it is either linear, or strictly
concave, or strictly convex. To eliminate the last possibility, observe that Axiom A5'
applied to acts f = xFy;g = yFx and events E and F with qb(F) = 1






2(u(y)) for all x;y 2 U.
It follows from Theorem 1 in Section 1 of Villegas (1964) that Axiom A8' delivers
countable additivity of qb. An application of the variational formula concludes the
proof.
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